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Does the brain use a firing rate code or a spike timing code? Considering this
controversial question from an epistemological perspective, I argue that progress has
been hampered by its problematic phrasing. It takes the perspective of an external
observer looking at whether those two observables vary with stimuli, and thereby misses
the relevant question: which one has a causal role in neural activity? When rephrased in
a more meaningful way, the rate-based view appears as an ad hoc methodological
postulate, one that is practical but with virtually no empirical or theoretical
support.
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INTRODUCTION
Neurons of the central nervous system interact primarily with action potentials or ‘‘spikes’’, which
are stereotyped electrical impulses. In an early electrophysiological experiment in sensory nerve
fibers of frog muscles, Adrian and Zotterman (1926) demonstrated that stimulation strength
modulated the frequency of spikes produced by the fibers. According to the classical view of neural
computation, the atom of information and computation is this ‘‘firing rate’’, and not the individual
spikes. In particular, the precise timing of spikes has little relevance in this view. In contrast,
a number of scientists have argued that neural computation critically relies on the temporal
coordination of spikes. There is a large diversity of such theories, some based on synchrony, for
example synfire chains (Abeles, 1991), polychronization (Izhikevich, 2006), binding by synchrony
(Singer, 1999; von der Malsburg, 1999) and synchrony invariants (Brette, 2012), others based on
asynchronous firing, for example rank order coding (Thorpe et al., 2001) and predictive spike
coding (Deneve, 2008). These two lines of neural theory are broadly categorized as ‘‘rate-based’’ and
‘‘spike-based’’.
Do individual spikes matter or can neural computation be essentially described in terms of
rates, with spikes physically instantiating this description? This contentious question has generated
considerable debate in neuroscience, and is still unsettled (Softky and Koch, 1993; Castelo-Branco
et al., 1998; Shadlen and Newsome, 1998; Singer, 1999; von der Malsburg, 1999; deCharms and
Zador, 2000; Thorpe et al., 2001; Banerjee et al., 2007; London et al., 2010; Randy, 2011). A number
of studies have addressed this problem by examining the information (in the sense of Shannon)
in spike timing and in firing rate (Petersen et al., 2002; Foffani et al., 2009; Quian Quiroga and
Panzeri, 2009); others have looked at empirical evidence supporting specific theories (Engel et al.,
2001; Fabre-Thorpe et al., 2001; Ikegaya et al., 2004).
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This text is entitled ‘‘Philosophy of the spike’’ because of its
epistemological character: its primary goal is to better define the
question and understand the nature of the arguments. To this
end, I will critically examine three common assertions in this
debate:
1. Both rate and spike timing are important for coding, so the
truth is in between.
2. Neural responses are variable, therefore neural codes can only
be based on rates.
3. The difference between rate-based and spike-based theories is
a question of timescale.
It will emerge from this analysis that much of the confusion in
this debate comes from casting the question exclusively in terms
of coding, that is, in terms of the relationship between stimuli and
particular observables (spike trains or rates). However, as I will
argue, the question of interest is not whether these observables
vary with stimuli, but rather whether they have a causal role
in the activity of the nervous system. In other words, can a
functional model of the nervous system be based on rates, or
are spikes indispensable? Since rates are defined as averages over
spikes, this question boils down to whether a realistic spike-
based model can be approximated by a rate-based model. I will
point out that the possibility of such an approximation requires
very stringent conditions, of which there is little or negative
evidence.
ASSERTION #1: BOTH RATE AND SPIKE
TIMING ARE IMPORTANT FOR CODING,
SO THE TRUTH IS IN BETWEEN
This assertion relies on two implicit assumptions: (1) that rate
and spike timing are two concepts of the same nature and (2) that
it is possible to conceive an intermediate concept that combines
them. Its logic also relies on what is known in philosophy as
the ‘‘golden mean fallacy’’, in reference to Aristotle: between
two extreme positions, an intermediate position is more likely
to be true. It is a fallacy because the conclusion does not follow
from the specific nature of the two positions, but from their
being arbitrarily presented as two extremes on a graded scale
of value. For example, some people believe that there is a God,
others think that there is no God. Does it follow that there is
half a God?
The first point I want to establish is that rates and spikes
belong to two different conceptual categories, and so there is
no middle ground between rate-based and spike-based views.
Second, I will show that the confusion in this assertion stems
mainly from the term ‘‘coding’’.
The Concept of Spike and the Concept
of Rate
Neurons mainly communicate with each other using trains
of electrical impulses or spikes. Some experimental evidence
suggests that spikes are not as stereotyped as we used to
think (Debanne et al., 2013). But in any case, they can be
characterized as discrete events, with a relatively well-defined
time, which we can identify to the time of release of synaptic
vesicles at the axonal terminal. Thus, with some qualifications
(see ‘‘Conclusion’’ Section), a single spike is associated with
physically measurable quantities, and it forms the basis of
communication between neurons on a fast timescale. To a large
extent (but this is not a key point), it can be characterized by its
timing.
On the other hand, in rate-based models of neural activity, the
firing rate is an abstract concept that is defined in a limit that
involves an infinite number of spikes (of course, experimental
measures of firing rate necessarily involve finite numbers of
spikes). For example, it can be defined for a single neuron
as a temporal average: the inverse of the mean inter-spike
interval. There are other definitions, but in all cases, rate is an
average quantity defined from the timing of spikes. Thus these
are two different concepts: spike timing is what defines spike
trains, whereas rate is an abstract mathematical construction on
spike trains. Therefore the rate vs. timing debate is not about
which one is the relevant quantity, but about whether rate is
a sufficiently good description of neural activity or not. Spike-
based theories do not necessarily claim that rate does not matter,
they refute the notion that rate is the essential quantity that
matters.
There are different ways of defining the firing rate (Figure 1):
over time (number of spikes divided by the duration, in the
limit of infinite duration), over neurons (average number of
spikes in a population of neurons, in the limit of an infinite
number of neurons) or over trials (average number of spikes
over an infinite number of trials). In the third definition (which
might be the prevailing view), the rate is seen as an intrinsic
time-varying signal r(t) and spikes are seen as random events
occurring at rate r(t). In all these definitions, rate is an abstract
quantity defined on the spike trains. Therefore when stating
that neural computation is based on rates rather than spike
timing, what is meant is that the concept of rate captures most of
the important details of neural activity and computation, while
precise spike timing is essentially meaningless. On the other
hand, when stating that spike timing matters, it is not meant
that rate is meaningless; it simply means that rate is not sufficient
to describe neural activity. Thus, these are not two symmetrical
views: the stronger assumptions are on the side of the rate-based
view. Of course, each specific spike-based theory makes a number
of possibly strong assumptions. But the general idea that neural
dynamics is based on individual spikes and not just rates is a
relatively weak assumption. The rate-based view is based on an
approximation, and the question is whether this is a good one or
a bad one.
Rate in Spike-Based Theories
The confusion in the assertion that ‘‘both rate and spike timing
are important for coding’’ stems from the use of the word
‘‘coding’’. Rates and spikes exist and vary with stimuli in both
rate-based and spike-based theories. In either type of theory,
rate and spike timing both ‘‘encode’’ stimuli, in the sense
of information theory, and therefore the coding perspective
is generally not the right way to distinguish between those
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FIGURE 1 | Definitions of firing rate. (A) Rate as a temporal average
(number of spikes n divided by observation time T). (B) Rate as a spatial
average over N neurons, on a short time window dt. (C) Rate as a probability
of firing, corresponding to an average over N trials for the same neuron.
theories—with a few exceptions when it can be shown that rates
are not sufficiently informative about stimuli to account for
behavior (Jacobs et al., 2009).
Specifically, the spike-based view does not in itself deny the
importance of the firing rate, it only denies its status as the
basis of computation. What do spike-based theories have to
say about firing rate? First of all, rate is important in spike-
based theories. The timing of a spike can only exist if there is a
spike. Therefore, the firing rate generally determines the rate of
information in spike-based theories, but it does not determine
the content of information. For example, in Denève’s predictive
coding theory (Boerlin et al., 2013) and more generally in spike-
based coding theories (e.g., Smith and Lewicki, 2006), neurons
spike when spiking at that time reduces an error criterion defined
on spike trains. Thus the firing rate correlates with the error
signal, but the corrective signal is carried by the precise timing
of spikes.
A very important concept in sensory neuroscience is the
selectivity curve or tuning curve, which measures how the
firing rate of a neuron varies with one particular aspect of
stimuli. For example, many cells in the primary visual cortex
(V1) fire more in response to a moving bar or grating with a
specific orientation (Hubel and Wiesel, 1959). The firing rate
could then be said to ‘‘encode’’ the orientation of bars. But
the level of oxygen in the blood also varies with orientation
(Yacoub et al., 2008), in a similar way, and so it can also
be said that oxygen level ‘‘encodes’’ the orientation of bars.
Can we conclude that the basic element of computation in
the brain is blood oxygen level? Clearly, the fact that an
observable co-varies with stimulus parameters does not in itself
imply that the observable has any causal role in processing the
stimulus.
Tuning curves of V1 neurons may form the basis of
orientation processing in the visual system, or they may be
a correlate of orientation processing—or more generally, a
correlate of processes that depend on orientation. Specifically,
any spike-based theory in which spiking incurs a cost (as in
e.g., Boerlin et al., 2013) predicts that the firing rate covaries with
the stimulus parameters involved in the processing, and therefore
that the rate ‘‘encodes’’ those parameters to some extent. The
firing rate then represents energy consumption (Attwell and
Laughlin, 2001), not computation.
From these observations, it follows that, in spike-based
theories, firing rate is a correlate of information processing in a
neuron. This stands in contrast with rate-based theories, in which
rate is the basis of information processing. But both types of
theories predict that firing rates correlate with various aspects of
stimuli—and therefore that there is information about stimuli in
firing rates for an external observer. Therefore, the fact that firing
rates vary in a systematical way with various aspects of stimuli is
consistent with both views. The difference between the two types
of theories is that in spike-based theories the firing rate measures
the quantity of information (energy consumption), while in rate-
based theories it constitutes the content of information.
Therefore the question is not whether firing rate or spike
timing matters or is informative about external stimuli, but
about which one is the basis of computation. In broader terms,
the question is whether the firing rate has a causal role in the
dynamics of the system.
ASSERTION #2: NEURAL RESPONSES
ARE VARIABLE, THEREFORE NEURAL
CODES CAN ONLY BE BASED ON RATES
Perhaps the most used argument against spike-based theories is
the fact that spike trains in vivo are variable both temporally
and over trials (Shadlen and Newsome, 1998), and yet this
might well be the least relevant argument. This assertion is what
philosophers call a ‘‘category error’’, when things of one kind are
presented as if they belonged to another. Specifically, it presents
the question as if it were about variability vs. reproducibility.
I will explain how variability can arise in spike-based theories,
but first an important point to make is that the rate-based view
does not explain variability, but rather it simply states that there
is variability.
The Variability Argument
There are two ways to understand the term ‘‘variable’’ and I
will first discard the meaning based on temporal variability.
Interspike intervals (ISIs) are highly variable in the cortex
(Softky and Koch, 1993), and their distribution is close to an
exponential (or Gamma) function, as for Poisson processes
(possibly with a refractory period; Figure 2A). This could
be interpreted as the sign that spike trains are realizations
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FIGURE 2 | Neural variability. (A) Responses of a MT neuron to the same
stimulus (reproduced from Shadlen and Newsome, 1998). Top: spike trains
over repeated trials, with the corresponding firing rate, meant as a firing
probability (Figure 1C). Middle: distribution of Interspike intervals (ISIs), with
an exponential fit (solid curve). Bottom: variance of spike count as a function
of mean count, with the prediction for Poisson processes (dashed).
(B) Responses of the same V1 neuron over five trials of the same stimulus,
represented as temporal firing rate (adapted from Schölvinck et al., 2015).
Left: comparison with the average response (gray curve), showing variability
over trials. Right: comparison with a prediction using the responses of other
neurons, showing that the variability does not reflect private noise.
(C) Responses of a single cortical neuron to a fluctuating current (middle)
injected in vitro (reproduced from Mainen and Sejnowski, 1995). Top:
superimposed voltage traces. Bottom: spike trains produced in the 25 trials.
(D) The Lorentz attractor, consisting of trajectories of a chaotic
three-dimensional climate model. Chaos is not randomness, as it implies
particular relations between the variables represented by the attractor.
of random point processes. This argument is very weak,
because the exponential distribution is also the distribution with
maximum entropy for a given average rate, which means that
maximizing the information content in the timing of spikes of
a single train also implies an exponential distribution of ISIs
(Rieke et al., 1999). Temporal variability cannot distinguish
between rate-based and spike-based theories, even in terms of
coding.
Therefore the only reasonable variability-based argument in
support of the rate-based view is the variability of spike trains
across trials, that is, the lack of reproducibility. In the cortex
(but not so much in some early sensory areas such as the retina
(Berry et al., 1997) and some parts of the auditory brainstem
(Joris et al., 1994)), both the timing and number of spikes
produced by a neuron in response to a given stimulus varies
from one trial to another (Shadlen and Newsome, 1998). This
means that the response of a neuron to a stimulus cannot be
described by a deterministic function of that stimulus. It could
be stochastic, chaotic, underdetermined, or dependent on an
uncontrolled variable (e.g., attentional state). This is the only fact
that such observations tell us. In particular, it does not tell us that
neural variability in the brain necessarily results from random
spiking processes with rates defined by deterministic continuous
dynamics, i.e., the rate-based view. The next sections will provide
examples of processes that do not follow this scheme.
Therefore, the argument of spike train variability is about
reproducibility, not about rate-based vs. spike-based theories. In
principle, it can only discard a deterministic spike-based theory
based on absolute spike timing, that is, requiring reproducible
spike timing with respect to the stimulus. However, spike-based
theories are generally based on relative timing across different
neurons (for example synchrony (Abeles, 1991; Izhikevich, 2006;
Brette, 2012) or rank order (Thorpe et al., 2001)), not on absolute
timing.
In fact, the argument can be returned against rate-based
theories. The use of this argument seems to imply that rate-
based theories take into account biological variability, whereas
spike-based theories do not. But in fact, quite the opposite is
true. Rate-based theories are fundamentally deterministic, and
a deterministic description is obtained at the cost of averaging
noisy responses over many neurons, or over a long integration
time (for example ‘‘neural mass’’ or ‘‘mean field’’ models; Deco
et al., 2008). On the other hand, spike-based theories take into
account individual spikes, and therefore do not rely on averaging.
In other words, it is not that rate-based descriptions account
for more observed variability, it is just that they acknowledge
that neural responses are noisy, but they do not account for any
variability at all. This confusion may stem from the fact that
spike-based theories are often described in deterministic terms.
But as stressed above, rate-based theories are also described in
deterministic terms.
The question is not whether spikes are reproducible; it is
whether the spiking interactions of neurons can be reduced to
the dynamics of average rates, in the same way as the mechanics
of individual particles can be reduced in some cases to the laws of
thermodynamics. This possibility does not follow at all from the
observation that the response of a given neuron is not the same
in all trials. In other words, the observation of variability itself
says little about the nature of the process that gives rise to that
variability. As I will now describe in more detail, a deterministic
spike-based theory can be consistent with variability due to a
variety of causes, in particular: state-dependence, deterministic
chaos, degeneracy.
State-Dependence
When a given sensory stimulus is presented several times, the
same neuron often responds differently over repeated trials.
However, we mean ‘‘the same’’ neuron in an anatomical sense,
in the same way as we would speak of ‘‘the same’’ organism.
But the very fact that we think and behave also means that
we are never exactly in the same state at any instant. Neurons
might be anatomically stable, but their state is not. Therefore,
the observation of non-reproducibility of neural responses may
simply reflect the fact that the state of the neuron or of the
network it is embedded in differs between trials (Masquelier,
2013; Renart and Machens, 2014).
First, many neurons, in particular cortical neurons, are
spontaneously active, that is, are active in the absence of any
sensory stimulus. This simple fact implies that those neurons will
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almost never be in the same state over repeated trials, and this
activity can account for a large part of observed variability (Arieli
et al., 1996). In fact, it has been shown both in the visual cortex
(Schölvinck et al., 2015) and in the auditory cortex (Deweese and
Zador, 2004) that a large part of the variability of neural responses
to stimuli can be accounted for by the variability in the activity
of the neighboring network, rather than by private variability
intrinsic to the recorded neuron. For example, Figure 2B (from
Schölvinck et al., 2015) shows that the responses of a neuron,
which vary between trials, can be well predicted by its trial-
averaged response (gray) plus a term proportional to the sum
of deviations from the mean responses of the other neurons,
observed in the same trial (termed ‘‘global noise’’). In other
words, a large part of inter-trial variability seems to reflect global
modulation of the responses of all neurons.
How much of this stimulus-unlocked activity is ‘‘noise’’?
Certainly, not all of it. A basic anecdotal remark is that,
in humans, consciousness does not vanish when external
stimulation stops. At a more physiological level, it is also
known that spontaneous activity is structured (Luczak et al.,
2007) and influenced by previous stimulus-driven activity
(Bermudez Contreras et al., 2013). An influential theory,
predictive coding theory, proposes that responses of neurons
to sensory stimuli reflect the combination of a feedforward
stimulus-driven input with a prediction mediated by higher
order areas (Rao and Ballard, 1999). If the prediction depends
on previous sensory experience, then it follows that responses
to the same repeated stimulus would vary over trials. Here
variability reflects the internal change in sensory prediction,
not noise (Berkes et al., 2011). This interpretation is in
line with the general notion that biological systems are
anticipatory systems (Rosen, 1985), and more generally with
the notion that behavioral responses depend not only on the
presented sensory stimulus but also on memory. This view is
supported by several studies showing that behavioral variability
is partly due to the influence of the recent history of stimulus
presentations (Gold et al., 2008; Marcos et al., 2013; Raviv et al.,
2014).
Second, at the single neuron level, as observed in a slice,
responses are much more reproducible than when the neuron
is embedded in an active network (Figure 2C). Specifically,
the responses of neurons to fluctuating currents injected at
the soma are reproducible at the millisecond timescale (Bryant
and Segundo, 1976; Mainen and Sejnowski, 1995). In addition,
dynamic photostimulation of presynaptic neurons also results in
reliable responses in cortical neurons, which means that synaptic
transmission and dendritic processing contribute a small amount
of noise, possibly because of multiple synaptic contacts between
cells (Nawrot et al., 2009). Reproducible responses are observed
despite the fact that the state of a neuron also changes over
trials in those experiments. In particular, adaptation in neurons
has power law characteristics, meaning that they adapt on all
time scales (Lundstrom et al., 2008). Therefore, despite the
experimental overestimation of noise, in vitro experiments show
that intrinsic neural noise is generally low.
In summary, the lack of reproducibility of neural responses to
sensory stimuli does not imply that neurons respond randomly
to those stimuli. There are a number of sensible arguments
supporting the hypothesis that a large part of this variability
reflects changes in the state of the neuron or of its neighbors,
changes that are functionally meaningful. This comes in addition
to the remark that stochasticity does not imply that the dynamics
of neural networks can be reduced to the dynamics of average
rates.
The Chaos Argument
A counter-argument to the idea that variability might be due to
uncontrolled but deterministic processes is that a large part of the
observed neural variability is irreducible because neural networks
are chaotic, that is, they are sensitive to initial conditions (van
Vreeswijk and Sompolinsky, 1996; Banerjee et al., 2007; London
et al., 2010). Indeed, if neural networks are chaotic, then their
responses would still not be reproducible even if all stimulus-
unrelated variables were controlled (e.g., attention or memory).
However, the argument misses its target because the idea that
rates entirely capture the state of the system does not follow from
lack of reproducibility.
In a chaotic system, nearby trajectories quickly diverge. This
means that it is not possible to predict the state of the system in
the distant future from the present state, because any uncertainty
in estimating the present state will result in large changes in
predicted future state. For this reason, the state of the system
at a distant time in the future can be seen as stochastic, even
though the system itself is deterministic. Specifically, while in
vitro experiments suggest that individual neurons are essentially
deterministic devices (Mainen and Sejnowski, 1995), a system
composed of interacting neurons can be chaotic, and therefore
for all practical aspects their state can be seen as random, so the
chaos argument goes.
The fallacy of this argument comes from the common
confusion between deterministic chaos and randomness. There
are at least two important well-known differences between chaos
and randomness (see a textbook on chaos theory for more detail,
e.g., Alligood et al., 1997). One is recurrence, that is, the fact that
similar short-term trajectories can reappear, although at possibly
unpredictable times. Recurrence follows trivially from the fact
that the system is deterministic: similar states will produce
similar trajectories in the short run, even though they might
ultimately diverge. In the prototypical chaotic system, climate, it
is well known that the weather cannot be accurately predicted
more than 15 days in the future, because even tiny uncertainties
in measurements make the climate models diverge very quickly.
However, it is still possible to make relatively accurate short-
term predictions over a few days, because a given atmospheric
configuration can lead to a predictable sequence of climatic
events. For example, a rapid drop in barometric pressure is often
followed by rain.
Recurrence is an explicitly postulated property of neural
networks in some spike-based theories, for example synfire
chains (Diesmann et al., 1999; Ikegaya et al., 2004) and
polychronization, which is an extension of synfire chains to
spatiotemporal patterns of spikes (Izhikevich, 2006; Szatmáry
and Izhikevich, 2010). Neither theory requires reproducibility
of spike timing, and indeed models that have been shown
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to instantiate those theories include either background noise
(Diesmann et al., 1999) or background network activity
(Szatmáry and Izhikevich, 2010). Those theories only rely on
the possibility of recurring patterns, which is compatible with
deterministic chaos.
In addition, other spike-based theories do not focus on
recurrence but do not require long-term predictability either. All
theories based on coincidence detection require stable relative
timing on the time scale of a neuron’s integration window, which
does not exceed a few tens of ms. Denève’s predictive coding
theory critically relies on relative spike timing but does not
require reproducible spiking patterns (Boerlin et al., 2013).
The second important difference between deterministic chaos
and randomness has to do with relations between variables.
According to the chaos argument, because precise spikes are not
reproducible, they can be equivalently replaced by random spikes
with statistics (rates) given by their long-term distributions.
This inference is incorrect in the case of deterministic chaos.
Taking the case of climate again, a counter-example is the
Lorenz system, a chaotic system of three differential equations
representing the evolving state of a model of atmostpheric
convection. The abovementioned argument would mean that the
behavior of the system can be adequately captured by replacing
the state variables by their long-term distributions. Even if we
allowed correlations between those variables, this would mean
that trajectories of the system fill a three-dimensional manifold.
Instead, trajectories lie in a lower-dimensional manifold called
strange attractor (Figure 2D), meaning that state variables are
more constrained than implied a continuous three-dimensional
distribution (e.g., a multivariate Gaussian distribution). In terms
of spiking networks, this means that the behavior of a chaotic
spiking network cannot be captured by a rate-based description.
In fact, these major differences between deterministic
chaos and randomness imply that the chaos argument is an
argument against rate-based theories, precisely because a chaotic
system is not a random system. Specifically, deterministic
chaos implies: (1) short-term predictability of spike trains; (2)
recurrence of precise spike patterns, and most importantly; and
(3) insufficiency of rate-based descriptions.
Degeneracy
Finally, variability can also arise in deterministic systems
when neural responses are underconstrained by the stimulus.
Underlying the argument of neural variability is the assumption
that spikes are produced by applying some operation on the
stimulus and then producing the spikes (with some decision
threshold; Figure 3A). The variability of spike timing between
trials, so the argument goes, must then reflect a corresponding
amount of noise, inserted at some point in the operation.
However, the observed state of a physical of system can often
be understood in a different way, as the state minimizing some
energy (Figure 3B). If the energy landscape has symmetries,
then different states have the same energy level and therefore
have the same probability of being observed. In the case of the
Mexican-hat energy landscape shown on Figure 3B, any state on
the low energy circle may be observed. This property of physical
FIGURE 3 | Variability due to degeneracy. (A) Spikes can be seen as the
result of a sequence of operations applied on an input signal, followed by
spike generation. In this view, variability comes from noise added in the spiking
process. (B) The state of a physical system can often be described as a
minimum of energy. Symmetries in the energy landscape can imply observed
variability, whose magnitude bears no relation with the amount of intrinsic
noise. (C) An example of the energy view is spike-based sparse coding. A
reconstruction of the signal is obtained from combining filtered spike trains
together, and spikes are timed so as to make the reconstruction accurate.
(D) If the system is redundant, the reconstruction problem is degenerate,
leading to several equally accurate spiking solutions (here obtained by
permutation of neurons).
systems is called degeneracy. Although in a Newtonian view, the
existence of this variability may be ultimately due to variations in
initial state or intrinsic noise, the amount of observed variability
is determined by the structure of the energy landscape, not by
the amount of intrinsic noise, which could be infinitesimal. In
addition, the observed variability is highly structured: in this case,
states lie on a particular circle—note that this implies a highly
constrained relation between the two observables even though
linear correlation is null.
Some spike-based theories follow the energy-minimization
view. An example is provided by the theory of sparse coding
(Olshausen and Field, 2004) applied to spikes. It has been used for
example to explain the receptive field of auditory neurons (Smith
and Lewicki, 2006), and recently it was related to the dynamics of
spiking neurons in an asynchronous spike-based theory (Boerlin
et al., 2013). In this theory, it is postulated that the time-varying
stimulus can be reconstructed from the firing of neurons, in the
sense that each spike contributes a ‘‘kernel’’ to the reconstruction,
at the time of the spike, and all such contributions are added
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together so that the reconstruction is as close as possible to
the original stimulus (Figure 3C). Note how this principle is in
some way the converse of the principle described in Figure 3A:
spikes are not described as the result of a function applied to the
stimulus, but rather the stimulus is described as a function of
the spikes. Thus spike encoding is defined as an inverse problem
rather than a forward problem. This approach has been applied
to the retina, where it was shown that the position of a moving
bar can be accurately reconstructed from the firing of ganglion
cells (Marre et al., 2014). In the theory of Denève and colleagues
(Boerlin et al., 2013), neurons fire so as to reduce the spike-based
reconstruction error; that is, the membrane potential is seen as a
reconstruction error and the threshold as a decision criterion.
An interesting point with regard to the issue of neural
variability is that, because the pattern of spikes is seen as a
solution to an inverse problem, there can be sensory stimuli
that are consistent with several patterns of spikes (Figure 3D).
That is, the reconstruction problem can be degenerate, if there
are regularities in the stimulus or redundancies in what neurons
encode (kernels). In the energy view, this means that there are
several states with the same energy level (energy being stimulus
reconstruction error). Imagine for example that two neurons
contribute exactly the same kernel to the reconstruction. Then on
one given trial, either of these two neurons may spike, perhaps
depending on tiny differences in their current state, or on the
random switch of a ionic channel. From the observer point of
view, this represents a lack of reproducibility. However, this
lack of reproducibility is precisely due to the precise spike-based
coordination between neurons: to minimize the reconstruction
error, exactly one of the two neurons should be active, and
the timing should be precise too. In contrast with rate-based
theories, the idea of spike-based coordination (i.e., optimal
placement of spikes so as to minimize some energy) predicts that
reproducibility should depend on properties of the stimulus, in
particular on some notion of regularity. Here the observed of
reproducibility bears no relation with the precision of the spike-
based representation, which, by construction, is optimal.
To summarize this set of points, the observation of neural
variability in itself says little about the origin of that variability.
In particular, variability in individual neural responses does
not necessarily reflect private noise. Generally, any theory that
does not see the sensory responses of neurons as an essentially
feedforward process predicts a lack of reproducibility. Thus the
existence of neural variability does not support the rate-based
view. In fact, any successful attempt to explain the origin of that
variability undermines rate-based theories, because the essence of
the rate-based view is precisely to explain neural variability away
by modeling it as private noise.
ASSERTION #3: THE DIFFERENCE
BETWEEN RATE-BASED AND
SPIKE-BASED THEORIES IS A QUESTION
OF TIMESCALE
It is tempting to view the difference between rate-based and
spike-based theories as one of the timescale of the description
(short timescale for spike-based theories, long timescale for
rate-based theories). This misconception again stems from a
confusion between coding, which is about relating stimulus and
neural activity for an external observer, and computation (in a
broad sense), which is about the way neurons interact with each
other.
One may for example consider the response of a neuron to
a stimulus over repeated trials and measure its post-stimulus
time histogram (PSTH). It seems that if the PSTH is peaky then
we should talk of a ‘‘spike timing code’’ and if it changes more
gradually a ‘‘rate code’’ might seem more appropriate, but really
these are words to describe the more accurate description, which
is the PSTH itself, with its temporal variations (Figure 4A). That
is, considering neuron firing as a point process with a time-
varying rate given by the PSTH is as good a description as it gets.
The fallacy of this argument lies in the choice of considering
neural responses exclusively from the point of view of an
external observer (the coding perspective), entirely neglecting the
interactions between neurons. It may be correct that the PSTH
provides a good statistical description of input-output responses
of that neuron. But on any given trial, neurons do not deal with
PSTHs. They deal with spike trains. On a given trial, the firing
of a given neuron is a priori determined by the spike trains of its
presynaptic neurons, not by their PSTHs. There is no guarantee
that the (time-varying) rate of a neuron can be described as a
function of presynaptic rates. If it were the case, then a neuron
FIGURE 4 | The timescale argument. (A) Responses of a neuron over
repeated trials, where the firing rate (PSTH shown below) varies on a fast (left)
or slow (right) time scale. (B) Whether the firing rate varies quickly or slowly,
the average rate is not generally sufficient to predict the response of a
postsynaptic neuron. Here the responses of two neurons are shown over two
trials. The postsynaptic neuron responds strongly when the presynaptic spike
trains are taken in the same trial (because they are synchronous), but not if the
spike trains are shuffled over trials.
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would respond identically if the presynaptic spike trains were
shuffled over trials, but it is trivial to show cases when this is not
true (Figure 4B). In any nonlinear system, the average output is
generally not a function of the average inputs, and making such
an assumption has little to do with the description timescale.
We can now start to spell out the rate-based view (Figure 5A).
It is postulated that: (1) for every neuron there exists a private
quantity r(t); (2) spike trains are produced by some random point
process with rate r(t); and (3) the rate r(t) of a neuron only
depends on its presynaptic rates ri(t), according to a dynamical
process. The really problematic postulate here is the third one.
The neuron does not have direct access to the presynaptic rates:
it has indirect access to them through the spike trains, which are
specific realizations of the processes. Thus this assumption means
that the operation performed on input spike trains, which leads to
the rate r(t), is essentially independent of the specific realizations
of the random processes.
How can assumption (3) be satisfied? One possibility that
comes to mind is the law of large numbers—this is the
essence of ‘‘mean-field’’ approaches (Figure 5B). If it can be
applied, then integrating inputs produces a deterministic value
that depends on the presynaptic rates, independent of higher
statistical orders (e.g., variance). But then the source of noise
in the spiking process (2), which produces stochastic spike
trains from a deterministic quantity, must be entirely intrinsic
to the neuron (see e.g., Ostojic and Brunel, 2011). Given that
experiments in vitro suggest that intrinsic noise is very low
FIGURE 5 | The rate-based view. (A) Each neuron is described by a private
quantity r(t), its rate, which determines the spike trains through a stochastic
process. Crucially, even though only the spike trains are directly observed by
the neuron, it is postulated that the rate r(t) only depends on the presynaptic
rates ri(t), and not on the spike trains themselves (f can be a function,
dynamical process or filter). (B) One option is that synaptic integration leads to
a quantity x(t); (e.g., membrane potential) that only depends on the rates ri(t)
by law of large numbers. As x(t) is deterministic, private noise must be added
so as to produce stochastic spike trains. (C) The other option is that there are
random fluctuations around the mean x(t) due to the spiking inputs, causing
output spikes. For these fluctuations to depend only on the rates, the
presynaptic processes must be independent, but we note that we have now
introduced correlations between inputs and outputs.
(Mainen and Sejnowski, 1995), this is a fairly strong assumption.
The other alternative is that random spikes are produced by
random fluctuations of the total input around its mean (higher
statistical orders; Figure 5C). But for these fluctuations to depend
only on the presynaptic rates, the inputs must be independent.
Here, we arrive at a critical difficulty, because we have just
introduced correlations between inputs and outputs, by allowing
output spikes to be produced by fluctuations in the total
input. Therefore, the required assumption of independence will
not generally hold when the process is repeated over several
layers, or when neurons are recurrently connected. One way
of addressing this difficulty is to postulate that neurons are
randomly connected with small probability, so that presynaptic
neurons are effectively independent, in addition to a large
amount of private noise (Brunel, 2000), which I will comment
in more detail in ‘‘Conclusion’’ Section.
What this discussion shows is that the problem has little to
do with the notion of timescale. It has to do with whether it is
possible to come up with a consistent model of neural activity in
which rate is a causal variable, in a way that is consistent with
biophysics. As it turns out, this is not a trivial task.
THE IMPORTANT QUESTION
Does the brain use a rate code or a spike timing code? The
conclusion of this analysis is that the phrasing of this question
is unfortunate. It casts the problem in the perspective of coding,
that is, as the problem of the relationship between external
stimuli and particular observables (rate or spike timing). It
entirely misses the core of the problem, which is to know whether
those observables have a causal role in the activity of the system,
or rather are a correlate of that activity. From that perspective
follow several misconceptions, in particular the idea that neural
variability is a challenge to spike-based views, and the idea that
the problem is about the timescale of description. It should be
stressed that none of the arguments I have listed against spike-
based views have any logical validity, because they address the
wrong question.
What is the right question then? We are considering two
types of models of the brain, spike-based models and rate-based
models. What is a model? A model is a formal system that
consists of observables and inference rules (see Rosen’s (1985)
excellent treatment of this question). It is a model of a particular
natural system when two properties are satisfied: (1) the natural
system can (potentially) be ‘‘encoded’’ into observables of the
model by means of measurement and (2) causality in the natural
system corresponds to inference in the model, that is, the
evolution of the natural system maps to changes in observables
that are consistent with the inference rules. This definition can
be made more general, but is sufficient for our purpose.
In the spike-based view, the observables are spike trains.
Spikes produce instantaneous changes in state variables of
neurons, which may or may not be observables [e.g., the
membrane potential as in the Hodgkin-Huxley model or some
more abstract variable as in the quadratic model (Ermentrout,
1996)]. These variables typically evolve according to some
continuous dynamical system (deterministic or stochastic),
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which usually follows from biophysical considerations. Spikes
are then produced and communicated to other neurons through
some form of decision on the neuron’s state variables. Thus,
generally, a spike-based model defines the relation between input
spike trains and output spike trains. It predicts future spikes from
the past history of spikes. There are a wide variety of spike-based
theories, which differ by the particular relations that are assumed
between spikes.
In the rate-based view, the observables are rates, which are
defined as some form of average over spikes. A rate-based model
then defines relationships between those rates over time, typically
taking the form of a continuous dynamical system (e.g., a set of
differential equations).
The key point is that rates are not independent observables.
They are defined from spikes. The rate-based view does not refute
the idea that spikes produced by a neuron depend on presynaptic
spikes through some integration process. Rather, it postulates
that spike-based dynamics can be approximated by a rate-based
model. In other words, the rate-based postulate is the postulate
that, under appropriate assumptions, a spike-based model can be
reduced to a rate-based model (Figure 6). This means that, when
spikes are mapped to rates (or conversely), inference in the spike-
based model is mapped to inference in the rate-based model. To
back up this postulate means two things: (1) to determine under
which assumptions this formal reduction is possible and (2) to
test whether those assumptions are empirically valid. It should be
noted that a large part of this problem is therefore of theoretical
nature.
Thus, a possible way to rephrase the question is the following:
is it possible to reduce the spiking interactions of neurons to the
interaction of rates? Where reduction is meant in the sense of
model reduction.
There is a striking analogy between this problem and the
articulation between thermodynamics and mechanics. Indeed
there are two ways to model a gas. A macroscopic analysis, in
FIGURE 6 | Reduction of a spike-based model to a rate-based model.
The spike model defines a relationship between presynaptic and postsynaptic
spike trains through a function S. The rate model defines a relationship
between rates through a function f. Rates are related to spikes through an
observation function R. Reduction is possible when the diagram commutes:
the composition of R and S equals the composition of f and R (mathematically,
R o S = f o R). This is not generally possible because R is not invertible (many
spike trains have the same rate).
which macroscopic observables (pressure, volume, temperature)
are related to each other, and a microscopic analysis, in which
individual particles are modeled by Newtonian mechanics. An
entire field of physics, statistical mechanics, is motivated by
the goal of making these two views consistent. Under some
conditions, the mechanical model can be reduced to some
extent to the thermodynamical model, and it is fair to say
that this reduction is far from trivial. The question at hand
regarding spike-based and rate-based views is of this kind: can
the spiking interactions of neurons be captured by some form of
thermodynamical model?
It is important to highlight a few important differences
with thermodynamics. The first point to note is that classical
thermodynamics was not initially derived from mechanics.
Rather, the laws of thermodynamics were established
independently of any mechanical description, and only later
was the connection attempted. In contrast, while there are
relatively well-established biophysical models of spike-based
interactions, no laws of this kind have so far been empirically
established at a macroscopic level, that is, in terms of rate-based
interactions, and it is an open question that such laws can even be
formulated. The second point is that the reduction of mechanics
to thermodynamics requires some sort of homogeneity between
particles, that is, that all particles play essentially the same role in
the macroscopic object. Applied to neurons, this is a very strong
requirement, especially as the structure of neural networks is
shaped by activity-dependent plasticity, resulting in particular
from the interaction of the organism with the environment, and
not only by random factors.
Thus, at the very least, there appears to be no obvious reason
why spiking interactions could be reduced to the continuous
dynamics of rates. But now that the question has been rephrased
in a more meaningful way, I will provide a few elements of
answer.
CAN THE DYNAMICS OF SPIKING
NETWORKS BE REDUCED TO RATES?
The general strategy to determine whether a formal reduction of a
spike-based model to a rate-based model is possible is as follows.
The first step is to derive the rate-based model that is consistent
with the spike-based model. We start by specifying the relation
between rates and spikes, for example we assume that spike trains
are independent realizations of Poisson processes with rates ri(t).
We then apply the inference rules of the spike-based model, for
example we calculate the properties of spike trains produced
by a spike-based neuron model receiving Poisson inputs. In
particular, we obtain a relation between input and output rates,
which is the inference rule in the rate-based model imported
from the spike-based model (see for example, Ostojic and Brunel,
2011).
The second step is to examine whether and under what
conditions those properties conform to the initial assumption,
for example that output spike trains are close to independent
Poisson processes. They may be drastically different, in which
case one may look either for a different relation between spikes
and rates, or for a different spike-based model. Spike trains
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produced by the spike-based model will never exactly conform
to the rate-based assumption, for the simple reason that inputs
and outputs cannot be statistically independent, since the former
determine the latter.
The third step is thus to check whether the violation of the
rate-based assumption is strong enough to introduce systematic
deviations between the dynamics of the two models. For example,
for a recurrent network, the derived inference rule is used to
determine self-consistent rates, and we can then check whether
these rates match those observed in the spike-based model
(for example by numerical simulation). In the same way, in a
multilayer feedforward neural network, one can check that the
repeated application of the rate-based operation over successive
layers yields the same output rates as those observed in the spike-
based model, where deviations might have been introduced in the
intermediate layers.
The Fluctuation-Driven Regime
In the 1990s, this strategy was used in a famous published
exchange about the rate vs. timing debate. Softky and Koch
(1993) argued that if spike trains were random (independent
Poisson processes), as they seemed to be in single unit recordings,
and if cortical neurons sum many inputs (about 10,000 synapses
for a pyramidal cell), then by the law of large numbers their
output should be regular, since the total input would be
approximately constant. Therefore, so they argued, there is an
inconsistency in the two hypotheses (independence of inputs
and integration). They proposed to resolve it by postulating that
neurons do not sum their inputs but rather detect coincidences at
a millisecond timescale, using dendritic nonlinearities. Shadlen
and Newsome (1994) demonstrated that the two hypotheses
are in fact not contradictory, if one postulates that the total
mean input is subthreshold, so that spikes only occur when
the total input fluctuates above its average. This is called the
‘‘fluctuation-driven regime’’. An electrophysiological signature
of this regime is a distribution of membrane potential that
peaks well below threshold (instead of monotonically increasing
towards threshold, as in the mean-driven regime), for which
there is experimental evidence (see Figure 7 of Rossant et al.,
2011; apparent diversity is due to the presence of up and down
states in anesthetized preparations). When there are many inputs,
this can happen when excitation is balanced by inhibition,
hence the other standard name ‘‘balanced regime’’ (note that
balanced implies fluctuation-driven, but not the other way
round).
In the fluctuation-driven regime, output spikes occur
irregularly, because the neuron only spikes when there is a
fluctuation of the summed input. Thus the two hypotheses
(random Poisson inputs and irregular output firing) are not
contradictory: it is completely possible that a neuron receives
independent Poisson inputs, integrates them, and fires in a quasi-
Poisson way, without any need for submillisecond coincidence
detection. Thus, for a single neuron, it is possible to come up with
a rate-based model that seems adequate. But note that the single
neuron case is not a particularly challenging situation, for by
assumption the output rate is a function of the input rates, since
those are the only parameters of the inputs in this scenario. The
significant result here is that, under certain conditions that seem
physiologically plausible, the output will also be quasi-Poisson, in
particular irregular.
Problems start when we consider that the neuron may be
embedded in a network. As Softky (1995) correctly argued in
response, output spikes are still determined by input spikes, so
they cannot be seen as random. In fact, it is precisely in the
fluctuation-driven regime that neurons tend to have precisely
timed responses (Mainen and Sejnowski, 1995; Brette and
Guigon, 2003). Specifically: input spike trains are independent
Poisson processes, the output spike train is (approximately) a
Poisson process, but inputs and outputs are not independent.
The question is whether the dependence between an input and
an output is weak enough that it can be ignored in the context of
a network. If we assume that inputs and outputs have about the
same average firing rate and there are N excitatory inputs, then
there should be one output spike for N input spikes, and therefore
the correlation between a given input and the output should be
of order 1/N on the time scale of integration. How significant is
1/N for a pairwise correlation?
It turns out that the fluctuation-driven regime, which is
necessary to preserve the statistical properties of Poisson
processes, is also the regime in which neurons are most sensitive
to correlations (Abeles, 1982; Rossant et al., 2011). How big
should pairwise correlations be to have an impact on the output
rate of a neuron? The answer is: about 1/N in the fluctuation-
driven regime. It follows from a simple argument. In the
fluctuation-driven regime, the output rate depends not only on
the mean input but also on its variance (for otherwise the neuron
would not fire at all). The variance consists of two terms: the sum
of variances of each synaptic input, of order N, and the sum of
covariances of all pairs of synaptic inputs, of order cN2, where c
is the pairwise correlation. Thus the second term starts to have an
impact as soon as pairwise correlations are of order 1/N. Higher-
order correlations have even greater impact.
In other words, in the fluctuation-driven regime, correlations
between inputs and outputs have just the right magnitude to
produce a significant impact on network dynamics. In passing,
we note that correlations of order 1/N are considerably smaller
than what is typically considered near zero in the experimental
literature (Ecker et al., 2010; Renart et al., 2010), because
measuring such small correlations would require very long
recordings or very large populations.
Thus, in standard biophysical neuron models, the
requirement that output spike trains are irregular leads to the
fluctuation-driven regime, but it is precisely in that regime that
neurons are most robust to noise and sensitive to correlations.
Correlations introduced between inputs and outputs by the
spiking process are sufficiently strong to impact target neurons.
This means that the rate-based postulate fails without additional
assumptions, which I will discuss below.
Recurrent Networks
The formal reduction of spike-based network models to rate-
based models has been investigated mostly in random networks,
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notably by Nicolas Brunel and colleagues, using methods from
statistical mechanics (Brunel, 2000). It is possible to derive
equations that describe the transformation between the input
rates of independent spike trains and the output rate of
an integrate-and-fire model. In a statistically homogeneous
network, one can then deduce the stationary firing rate of the
neurons, which can be compared to numerical simulations.
The approach has also been applied to calculate self-sustained
oscillations (time-varying firing rates) in such networks (Brunel
and Hakim, 1999). As we have seen, the approach cannot work
in general, and therefore additional assumptions are introduced.
In this line of work, two typical assumptions are: a large amount
of private noise (independent between neurons) and sparse
connectivity (i.e., pairs of neurons are connected randomly with
low probability). Private noise reduces input-output correlations,
and sparse random connectivity ensures that input and output
neurons have few targets in common. Results of simulations
diverge from theory when the connection probability increases,
meaning that the rate-based reduction does not work in those
cases. Unfortunately, neither of the two additional assumptions
introduced to make this reduction possible are empirically valid.
In particular, real neural networks do not look like random sparse
networks, for example they can be strongly connected locally,
neurons can be bidirectionally connected or form clusters (Song
et al., 2005; Perin et al., 2011).
Thus another type of assumption has been investigated
recently, which applies to densely connected networks. Instead
of postulating that anatomical correlations are negligible, it is
hypothesized that correlations are actively canceled.
Cancellation of Correlations
As I explained above, the spiking process introduces correlations
between inputs and outputs, and therefore between neurons that
have inputs in common. A potential problem for the dynamics
of neural network models is that in a recurrent network, those
correlations can build up and lead to very unnatural dynamical
behaviors. This is a problem for spiking models, independently
of whether they can be reduced to rate models. Recently, it
was shown that it is possible to avoid this problem in dense
networks under appropriate assumptions, when inhibition tracks
excitation (Renart et al., 2010; Litwin-Kumar and Doiron, 2012).
In that case, neurons fire irregularly and ‘‘asynchronously’’, in
the sense that average pairwise correlations are of order 1/N.
Neurons have then been described as ‘‘effectively independent’’
(Renart et al., 2010) or with ‘‘negligible’’ correlations (Litwin-
Kumar and Doiron, 2012), but there are important qualifications
to make here. Such correlations are negligible for the problem
at hand, which is to avoid runaway synchronous activity. But
they are not negligible in general. First, as discussed above,
correlations of order 1/N are sufficient to have a substantial
impact on target neurons. Second, the 1/N scaling is a spatial and
temporal signed average. The absolute magnitude of individual
pairwise correlations is actually of order 1/
√
N, which is much
larger (i.e., there are positive and negative correlations that cancel
out when averaged over all pairs). This implies in particular
that when the network structure is not uniform, correlations can
be systematically larger in some parts of the network (Litwin-
Kumar and Doiron, 2012). Third, correlations are temporal
averages (by definition): two neurons can be weakly correlated
and yet occasionally participate in events of synchronous firing
within a group of neurons. One should not confuse synchrony,
which is the transient simultaneous firing (at the integration time
scale) of a group of neurons, and correlation, which a long-term
probability of simultaneous firing of two neurons. Synchrony
plays a central role in a number of spike-based theories (Abeles,
1991; Izhikevich, 2006; Szatmáry and Izhikevich, 2010; Brette,
2012) but correlations rarely do. For all these reasons, low
correlations are not a sufficient condition to derive a rate-based
model from a spike-based model.
To clarify the point that low correlations do not specifically
support the rate-based view, I will now briefly discuss
correlations in spike-based theories. Weak correlations are
actually a wanted feature of all spike-based theories. This
point was indeed acknowledged in the abovementioned study
(Renart et al., 2010): ‘‘By preventing uncontrolled network-
wide synchrony, this mechanism generates a background of
weakly correlated spiking, as required for efficient information
processing based on either firing rates or coordinated spike
timing patterns’’. This is indeed so even (and perhaps especially)
in the spike-based theories that put most weight on synchrony,
the theory of synfire chains (Griffith, 1963; Abeles, 1991)
and its extensions (synfire braids (Bienenstock, 1995) and
polychronization (Izhikevich, 2006; Szatmáry and Izhikevich,
2010)) and the theory of synchrony invariants (Brette, 2012). In
the latter, for example, synchrony reflects the presence of some
invariant structure in the sensory signals, that is, the property
that the sensory signals follow some particular sensory law. It
is therefore meant to be stimulus-specific. In all these theories,
synchrony is a meaningful event and therefore, it must be rare.
In this respect, all mechanisms that tend to cancel expected
correlations (for example those due to anatomical factors) are
desirable features. There are also spike-based theories that are
based on asynchrony (Thorpe et al., 2001; Boerlin et al., 2013),
for which low correlations are a basic feature.
CONCLUSIONS
Rate-based and spike-based theories of the brain have been
often compared to each other by addressing the following
question: ‘‘does the brain use a rate code or a spike timing
code?’’. The coding perspective may help distinguish between
rate-based and spike-based theories when it can be shown that
one observable carries an insufficient amount of information to
account for behavior (Jacobs et al., 2009; Goodman et al., 2013),
but this situation is rare. It can also address related questions,
such as the timescale of behaviorally relevant information in
neural responses (Zuo et al., 2015). But in general, it cannot
fundamentally distinguish between rate-based and spike-based
theories of the brain, because it focuses on the relation between
sensory inputs and neural activity for an external observer
and therefore it misses a crucial element of both theories:
the way neurons interact with each other. Rates are defined
in both rate-based and spike-based theories, but they have
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different roles: causal in the former, correlational in the latter.
Neural variability and low correlations are also typical features
of both types of theories, whether they reflect noise or other
factors.
The relevant question is thus: are firing rates atoms of
computation or are they just correlates of computation? Because
rates are defined as averages over spikes, this question boils
down to whether it is possible to reduce the spiking interactions
of neurons to the interaction of rates, in a similar way as
the mechanical interactions of particles can be reduced to
thermodynamical laws in some cases.
However, there is an important epistemological difference
with the case of thermodynamics. Statistical mechanics was
developed in an attempt to make two sets of laws consistent:
macroscopic laws of thermodynamics and microscopic laws of
mechanics. Both were already established, and the question was
whether it was possible that one implies the other. The situation is
quite different here: laws of spike-based interactions have to some
extent been established, but it is an open question whether there
are macroscopic laws at all. What has been established to date is
that the reduction of spike-based models to rate-based models is
not possible in general, and there is no strong indication that it
should be in the case of biological neural networks.
If there is neither empirical evidence nor theoretical support
for the rate-based view, then why does it have such a broad
support in neuroscience? The simple answer is that it is a
methodological postulate, before being an empirical hypothesis.
A large part of neuroscience theory fits the computationalist
framework, in which cognitive functions are described as
sequences of mathematical operations defined at a relatively
abstract level that is not directly physiological—for example as
a combination of linear and nonlinear operations on images
(Carandini et al., 1997). Marr (1982) famously argued that we
should first try to understand the computational and algorithmic
level of cognitive functions, and then independently care about
the physical level (neurons), seen as an implementation. It would
thus be most convenient if those familiar calculations defined
at the algorithmic level could be interpreted as operating on
rates, using standard algebra defined on continuous values, and
then rate-based calculus could be implemented with spikes. It
would be convenient, but there is no a priori empirical reason
why it should be so. There is also no a priori functional
reason: why would there be any evolutionary pressure for
making things simpler for us scientists to understand? In
this sense, the rate-based view is primarily a methodological
postulate.
I have limited this discussion to spiking interactions,
neglecting the many other types of interactions, for example
ephaptic interactions (Anastassiou et al., 2011), gap junctions
(Dere and Zlomuzica, 2012) and graded synaptic transmission
(Debanne et al., 2013). This was not to dismiss the potential
importance of those interactions, but to specifically analyze the
articulation between spike-based and rate-based views. If spike-
based interactions cannot be reduced to rate-based interactions,
then a fortiori more complex interactions will bring additional
difficulties for such a reduction.
How can we make further progress on this question? As
the rate-based view is a methodological postulate, and to date
mostly an article of faith, the burden of proof should be on the
supporters of that view. The strategy is first to show under what
conditions it is possible to reduce spike-based models to rate-
based models, which is essentially a theoretical task, and then to
determine to what extent those conditions are met in the brain.
For the defenders of the spike-based view, the strategy should
be different. Contrary to what Popper’s logical analysis suggests
(Popper, 1959), historical analysis shows that theories are rarely
overthrown by empirical refutation alone (Kuhn, 1962), because
such refutations may simply lead to refined versions of the
theory, sometimes with good reason. New theories tend to
replace old theories because they provide a more productive
alternative (Lakatos et al., 1978). Rate-based theories are well
alive because they fill a methodological need. Thus my suggestion
would rather be for defenders of the spike-based view to provide
a constructive opposition by developing theories of spike-based
computation or dynamics that could favorably replace rate-based
calculus, in addition to being empirically sound.
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